Mexico’s Drug War Continues to Claim Lives
Contributor: Kimberly Bennett
Following a scathing February 2013 report from Human Rights Watch criticizing Mexico’s military and law enforcement for former President Felipe Calderon’s actions that exacerbated the violence stemming from the Drug War, an outburst of drug cartel violence claimed numerous lives in the border city of Reynosa, Mexico. Because cartel members retrieved and buried their own members’ bodies, officials were unable to determine an official body count—though estimates range from 12 to over 50 dead. Calderon’s government stopped counting deaths resulting from drug violence in September 2011—proof that even the government cannot keep track of the death toll. Civilians have responded to the violence by arming themselves against cartels—heightening violence and the increasing the chances of violent clashes. Human Rights Watch is urging the Mexican government to implement reforms to its law enforcement policies that will reduce the number of victims disappeared and killed as a result of the Drug War.
Sources and further reading:
Yahoo! News- Drug War Death Tolls Guess Without Bodies
Panoramas- HRW Criticizes Mexican Government Disappearances
USA Today- Monterrey Mexico Bodies
Human Rights Watch- Mexico’s Disappeared
New York Times- HRW Faults Mexico Over Disappearances
Other news stories of interest:
Christian Today- Deep Concern Over Violence in Latin America
The Huffington Post- Border Drug Busts Citizens -Americans and Mexicans
Contributor: Jessica Hredzak
Guatemala’s 36-year long civil war has been over since 1996 but justice has yet been given to all those who committed war crimes during this brutal battle for power. On March 19, in the world’s first-ever national prosecution of an ex-head-of-state for crimes against humanity, Efraín Rios Montt, Guatemalan dictator from 1982-1983, faces charges of genocide and other crimes against humanity in Guatemala’s national court. His rule saw some of the most brutal atrocities of the civil war. According to the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission in 1999, Montt is accused of sending soldiers into hundreds of Mayan villages to rape, torture, and kill more than 1,700 Mayans in an effort to quell opposition forces through elimination of the indigenous population. Montt evaded these charges for years, because he served in Guatemala’s Congress, where public officials are granted immunity by law. Montt denies the charges, and in his favor, prosecutors cannot directly prove that Montt commanded these atrocities. With time, hundreds of witnesses, and mounting evidence, prosecutors aim to prove that there was an established chain of command for such orders.
Sources and Further Reading:
§ PBS – Timeline: Guatemala’s Brutal Civil War
§ New York Times – Ex-Dictator Is Ordered to Trial in Guatemalan War Crimes Case
§ Panoramas, University of Pittsburgh – Guatemalan ex-leader trial begins
§ BBC – Guatemala ex-ruler Rios Montt on trial for genocide
§ Reuters – Guatemala tries ex-dictator Rios Montt in landmark case
Other News Stories of Interest: (Links to other important issues from the past week)
§ Aljazeera – ‘Executed’ Mexicans displayed on chairs
§ CNN – Venezuela cutting off contact with U.S. diplomat, foreign minister says
Author: Michael Flickinger
Iran endures as the last functional theocracy in the world, steeped in a history rich with conquest, subjugation, and cultural innovations. Popular conceptions of Iran stir images of the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, seizure of the American embassy, and murals in Tehran depicting America as “the Great Satan.” More recent portrayals, however, offer what some speculate might be a crack in the impenetrable regime that has ruled Iran since the Revolution. Pictures of men and women adorned in green to support Mir Hossein Mosavi, leader of the Reformists and the Green Movement, chanting, “Death to the dictator” mingle with footage of Neda Agha-Soltan bleeding to death, while Basij militiamen on motorcycles beat protestors. In the span of three decades, violence once again erupted within Iran and protestors railed against the current regime with a fervor similar to Khomeini’s followers against the shah. For those who favor a less opaque and more cooperative Iran, these events raised the hope that change looms on the horizon. But does it?
Authors: Russell Moll and Tyler Livermore
Al Shabaab is a hardline Islamist Organization that controls large swathes of territory in south and central Somalia. Founded in 2004 as the youth militancy of the now defunct and splintered Islamic Courts Union, the group rose to prominence in 2006 as an insurgency opposing the US-backed Ethiopian intervention forces. Following the January 2009 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, Al Shabaab seized control of portions of Southern Somalia, instituting its austere brand of Salafist Sharia , and relegating the control or the internationally backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), to “a few city blocks” in Mogadishu. Since May 2009 Al Shabaab has waged a brutal campaign against the TFG. Skirmishes between the 4,300-member African Union protectorate force and Al Shabaab became an almost daily occurrence. The later part of 2009 saw even more forceful attacks by Al Shabaab against civilian, military, and TFG targets. While Al Shabaab has pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda since 2007, its relations with regional Al Qaeda groups as well as placement of key Al Qaeda figures within its leadership have stoked western fears that Somalia could turn into a, “significant Al-Qaeda safe-haven“. Continue reading
Author: Drew Stragar-Rice
The purpose of this analysis is to track the military trends and political developments associated with Hezbollah. Of particular interest is the paternal relationship extended from Tehran and Damascus toward the “Party of God.” The implication of this nexus impacts American interests pertaining to a non-nuclear Iran, a secure Israel, and ultimately a stabilized Middle East. Through careful analysis of Hezbollah’s actions we hope to provide a better understanding to some of the most essential obstacles toward stability in the region. Continue reading
Author: Colin Clarke
Following the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States intervened in Afghanistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in that country. Sheltered by the Taliban, a Muslim Fundamentalist group that had seized power in the mid-1990s, Al-Qaeda had used Afghanistan as a safe haven for planning the attacks on the United States. After initial successes, however, the U.S. intervention ran into serious difficulties. By the end of 2009, despite an overwhelming advantage in firepower and technology, U.S. and NATO troops operating in Afghanistan had failed to dislodge a resurgent Taliban, while Al-Qaeda had largely regrouped across the border in neighboring Pakistan. Although drone strikes from Predator aircraft kept Al-Qaeda and its allies on the run, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan emerged as a haven for terrorists from Chechnya, Kashmir, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Continue reading
Update by Sean Hannan
On September 9, 2010, 24 Marines from USMC 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) force reconnaissance platoon boarded the Magellan Star after it had been taken over by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. In what is known as a visit-board-search-seizure, or VBSS, the Marine raiders boarded the pirate-controlled vessel and stormed the ship, taking the nine hijackers into custody without firing a single shot. According to Captain Alexander Martin, USMC “As soon as the first stack [of Marines] made our way into the bridge, their hands were up, their weapons were down, they moved to their knees, and were very compliant.”1 The Marines launched from the USS Dubuque which was operating under the control of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151).11 A Turkish frigate had been the first to respond to the Magellan Star’s distress signal, and the USS Dubuque and USS Princeton subsequently provided additional support. The eleven Magellan Star crewmembers retreated to a safe room onboard as the pirates boarded their ship3 and White House and Pentagon officials decided to launch the raid after it was confirmed the crew was out of harm’s way.4 The successful VBSS of the Magellan Star marks the first time US military forces have boarded a ship actively controlled by Somali pirates.5
This should be viewed as both an encouraging incident, and a precedent for direct military action against Somali pirates. Permission for the force reconnaissance operators to board and retake the pirate-controlled vessel is reported to have come directly from Defense Secretary Roberts Gates.6 Consent for the mission was also developed in conjunction with other top-level Pentagon and White House officials.7 This suggests that top-level officials are aware of the type of response needed to quell incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, the United States has been the lead military force in taking direct action against Somali pirates, as seen by the Magellan Star boarding, as well the rescuing of Captain Richard Phillips of the Maersk Alabama by Navy SEAL snipers in April 2009.8 The United States continues to bear the burden of applying military force, and the United States Marine Corps has increased training in VBSS tactics in hopes of promoting readiness to conduct counter-piracy operations.9 Even before the Magellan Star incident, such training had taken place at USMC bases nationwide.10 East Coast-based Marine MEUs have been training in the use of VBSS from the air by boarding vessels using helicopters and MV-22 Osprey aircraft for fast roping onto ship decks. West Coast-based MEUs have been perfecting the art of seaborne boarding – the tactic used in the Magellan Star VBSS – using rigid inflatable boats. Both methods operate in conjunction with the US Navy, with sailors also taking part in VBSSs.11 While it is reported that the increased training is not a direct response to the number of piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa, it is a sign that more military intervention is expected.
While the root causes of piracy, such as underdevelopment and lack of domestic governmental control within Somalia, cannot be ignored, direct military action that defeats and deters acts of piracy will continue to be pursued by the United States operating under the jurisdiction of CTF 151. Military interdiction is necessary to fill the gaps while development and governmental control take hold in Somali. Hopefully, Somalis will desist from piracy as a legitimate economy develops. That development will take some time, maybe even decades to establish. The United States is preparing for a long fight. It can only be hoped that the fight is as successful as the retaking of the Magellan Star.
“U.S. forces board pirate-captured vessel.”
Lamonthe, “Conway endorses force.”
“Captain freed after snipers kill pirates.” MSNBC.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30178013/ (accessed September 14, 2010).
Author: Sean Hannan
According to Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy: consists of any of the following acts:
- any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
- on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
- against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). Continue reading
Authors: Beatriz Binkley & Laura Smith
Somali Pirates © Veronique de Viguerie, via The Guardian
The past two decades have witnessed a significant increase in the level of worldwide maritime piracy. With more than 50 percent of all contemporary maritime attacks attributed to Somali pirates, no other region is capable of generating more piracy-related investigations and analysis. Unfortunately, as the proliferation and success of Somali pirates continues, the organizational sophistication of pirate gangs will also increase, and the problem will spread to other areas with similarly enabling factors. Somali pirates are models for other prospective pirates to emulate. Yet they also provide case studies into how shipping companies and the international community can work to address the piracy problem. Against this background, this analysis moves beyond discussing the root cause of Somali piracy and breaks down the anatomy of attacks, looking at the possible successes and failures at different stages of the process. However, with high rewards and low risks for the pirates, the struggle to reduce piracy may be an uphill battle. Continue reading